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TIME LIMIT ON BANKRUPTCY
RESTRAINING ORDERS
Article I, section 8 of the federal constitution confers upon
Congress the power to pass "uniform laws on the subject of bank-
ruptcies throughout the United States." This provision is the genesis
of the present Bankruptcy Act.
Under the Bankruptcy Act bankruptcy courts are vested with
such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise
original jurisdiction in proceedings under the act.' Bankruptcy
courts are courts of equity and have the power to issue all process,
including restraining orders and preliminary and final injunctions,
necessary to protect and effectuate its jurisdiction.2 More specifi-
cally, the power of the bankruptcy court to grant injunctive relief
in bankruptcy hearings is established by section 2(a) 15 of the
Bankruptcy Act which gives the court authority to
make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in
addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the
enforcement of provisions of this Act; provided, however, that an
injunction to restrain a court may be issued by the judge only.3
The question examined in this note is whether the court in
issuing a restraining order is limited by the procedural requirements
of Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' Rule 65(b)
provides that every temporary restraining order issued without no-
tice "shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not
to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes. . .
1 BANKRUPTCY AcT § 2(a), 11 U.S.C. § 11.
2 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 1612 (2d ed. 1955); In re Lustron Corp., 184
F. Supp. 789 (7th Cir. 1950).
8 11 U.S.C. § 11.
4 For an excellent general discussion of the application of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to bankruptcy, see Yankwich, The Impact of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure on Bankruptcy, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 738 (1954).
5 Rule 65(b) provides in part that:
No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the ad-
verse party unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit
or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing
had thereon. Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall
be indorsed with the date and hour of issuance; shall be filed forthwith in
the clerk's office and entered of record; shall define the injury and state
why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and
shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days,
as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause
shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against whom the
order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period.
RESTRAINING ORDERS
BANKRUPTCY ACT AND FEDERAL RULES
Injunctions and restraining orders are frequently issued by
bankruptcy courts to preserve the status quo and prevent creditors
from harassing the bankrupt and draining assets from the estate.6
It is in these instances that the applicability of Rule 65 (b) becomes
significant. Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Bankruptcy Act must be consulted. The Federal Rules provide:
"These rules . . . do not apply to proceedings in bankruptcy . . .
except in so far as they may be made applicable thereto by rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States."7 Under
the Bankruptcy Act, General Order 37 provides as follows: "In
proceedings under the Act the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States shall, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the Act or with these general orders, be followed
as nearly as may be."' General Order 37 was promulgated by the
Supreme Court; thus it would appear that the bankruptcy courts
are under a mandate of the Supreme Court to apply the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure unless they are inconsistent with the
Bankruptcy Act.9
In order to clarify the significance of the above provisions in
relation to the applicability of Rule 65(b), the principal remedial
devices available in a bankruptcy court will be treated separately.
Thus Rule 65(b) and its bearing upon strict bankruptcy proceed-
ings, Chapter XI Arrangements, and Wage Earner Plans under
Chapter XIII will be treated independently. 10
Further clarity in thought is aided if a distinction is drawn
between summary and plenary actions and their relation to injunc-
tions and temporary restraining orders. While this article is pri-
marily concerned with temporary restraining orders, some mention
of injunctions is proper at this point.
The bankruptcy court, as an incident to its powers to ascertain
the rights of a bankrupt, may make use of the injunctive process
to prevent interference with its jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy Act
contains a special provision for injunctive relief against actions
pending in other courts involving a claim from which a discharge
6 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 343 (14th ed. 1962). For a practical discussion of
injunctions and restraining orders in bankruptcy, see COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE 496 (1963).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a).
8 General Order in Bankruptcy 37; 305 U.S. 698 (1938); 11 U.S.C. following
§ 53 (1952).
9 See In re Calif. Lumber Corp., 24 F.R.D. 190 (S.D. Calif. 1959).
10 In re Arzaga, 204 F. Supp. 617, 619 (S.D. Calif. 1962) indicates the importance
of distinguishing the remedy sought.
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would be a release." Again, this article will not concern itself with
the applicability of Rule 65(b) to this type of injunctive relief.
Similarly, the intricacies of summary and plenary actions
preclude anything more than a general mention of fundamental
elements. Basically, summary jurisdiction involves proceedings in
bankruptcy and controversies arising in proceedings in bankruptcy,
while plenary matters are those involving suits between the trustee
and third parties brought in the form of ordinary civil actions.' 2
The effects of the distinction between summary and plenary actions
upon the applicability of Rule 65(b) will be discussed below.
The inconsistency with which the courts have applied the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bankruptcy proceedings leaves
the practitioner and observer perplexed. Authorities heralded the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the vehicle by which con-
sistency of procedure and uniformity of application would be intro-
duced into the bankruptcy area.' Judge Yankwich stated:
Procedure by rule in bankruptcy has an added significance, be-
cause of the importance of achieving uniformity in administration. It
makes it possible to develop a unitary system of procedure aiming
to attain in a uniform manner the primary object of the bankruptcy
act, which to paraphrase an old decision, is to release the bankrupt
from the obligation to pay the debts of his creditors and "secure ajust distribution" of the bankrupt's property among them.14
In order to have uniformity of application, the authors of this
article believe that a rule as to the application of Rule 65(b)
should be formulated.
STRAIGHT BANKRUPTCY: CASE LAW
In the case of In Re California Lumber Corp.'5 the referee
without notice issued an order restraining the bankrupt's lessors and
their attorney from instituting any proceeding against the trustee
without an order from the court. The order also restrained them
from interfering with peaceful possession of the leased premises
11 BANKRUPTCY ACT § ll(a), 11 U.S.C. § 29(a). See COWANS, BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE 496-502 (1963). It would seem that some argument could be
made that § 65(b) is inconsistent with § 11(a) thus precluding its applicability.
This possibility has not been forcefully argued in the cases.
12 CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 435 (1963); 2 COLLIER, BANK-
RUPTCY 431 (14th ed. 1962); NADLER, CREDITOR AND DEBTOR RELTIONs 364 (1956);
SA REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 2350 (5th ed. 1953).
13 Friebolin, Report of the Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Practice,
28 REF. J. 21 (1954).
14 Yankwich, The Impact of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Bankruptcy,
42 CALIF. L. REV. 738, 740 (1954).
15 24 F.R.D. 190 (S.D. Calif. 1959).
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and taking any further action against the bankrupt corporation,
premises, or trustee. Since the order did not specify an expiration
date, the court strictly applied Rule 65(b) and held that the order
expired ten days after its issuance. The court stated: "In the ab-
sence of inconsistencies referred to in General Order 37, the bank-
ruptcy courts are under a mandate of the Supreme Court to apply
the Rules of Civil Procedure.""
In Benitez v. Anciani" the court also applied Rule 65(b) in
a bankruptcy proceeding, holding that where an application for
a temporary restraining order is granted without hearing or notice,
the order will expire after ten days.
In the frequently cited case of In re Lustron'8 a different result
was reached when the court refused to apply Rule 65 (b) to a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Following an injunction against Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, procedural objections were raised alleging
that the court did not comply with the requirement of Federal
Rule 65(b). The court held that "we are inclined to believe that
the paramount authority of the bankruptcy court under the Bank-
ruptcy Act is such that the rules which apply to ordinary restraining
orders are not applicable to restraints of courts and parties, in aid
of the Bankruptcy Act."' 9 The court, in reaching this decision,
drew a distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court. It indicated that if the proceedings involve
summary jurisdiction, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should
not apply, but in plenary actions the rules should be given their
full force and effect.
The rationale in the Lustron case was also used in the case of
In re Hudzinski20 Again the court refused to apply Federal Rules
65(b) and 65(c) to a bankruptcy proceeding.
The same confusion and lack of uniformity in application
indicated above exists when other sections of Rule 65 are exam-
ined. 1 Courts have used the plenary versus summary jurisdiction
argument to hold that Rule 65(c)22 is also inapplicable to bank-
16 Id. at 192.
17 127 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1942).
18 184 F. Supp. 789 (7th Cir. 1950).
19 Id. at 797.
20 85 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
21 Halpert v. Engine Air Service, Inc., 212 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1954); Chatz v.
Freeman, 204 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1953); In re Hudzinski, 85 F. Supp. 341 (W.D.
Pa. 1949); see generally 103 U. PA. L. REv. 433 (1955); 67 HARV. L. REV. 512
(1955); 7 STAN. L. Rv. 120 (1955).
22 Rule 65(c) provides:
Security. No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except
upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems
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ruptcy proceedings. The court in Halpert v. Engine Air Service,
Inc.2" held that the rule requiring posting of security by an appli-
cant for a preliminary injunction is not a restriction on a court of
bankruptcy in exercise of its powers. The district court had dis-
cretionary power to issue an injunction preserving the status quo
pending determination of the trustee's plenary proceeding to recover
alleged voidable transfers, without requiring bond.
In Chatz v. Freeman24 the majority held that the trial court
erred in issuing a temporary restraining order without providing
for security as required by Rule 65(c). However, in a soundly
reasoned dissenting opinion, Judge Major alluded to the Lustron
case and concluded that by analogy Rule 65 (c) is also inapplicable.
CHAPTER XI AND CHAPTER XIII
A logical distinction has been formulated between cases which
grant relief in straight bankruptcy proceedings and those which
fall under the rehabilitation provisions of Chapter XI and debtor
relief provisions of Chapter XIII. The courts reject the contention
that 65(b) applies to the latter rehabilitation proceedings on the
ground that this would be inconsistent with section 314 of Chapter
X12 5 and section 614 of Chapter XIII. 6
Judge Kirkpatrick, in the leading case of In re Haines Lumber
Co.,27 asserts that while section 314 of the act does not authorize
an ex parte injunction, but does provide that the court may enjoin
or stay a proceeding to enforce a lien upon notice and showing
cause, it does not forbid the entry of a restraining order without
notice in a proper case. In referring to jurisdiction to enter an order
without notice, he quotes Collier:
That jurisdiction is derived from the power conferred by Section
2(a)(15) of the Act to make such order as may be necessary for the
proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred
or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined
or restrained. No such security shall be required of the United States or of
an officer or agency thereof.
23 212 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1954).
24 204 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1953).
25 BANKRUPTCY ACT § 314, 11 U.S.C. § 714:
The court may, in addition to the relief provided by section 11 of this Act
and elsewhere under this chapter, enjoin or stay until final decree the
commencement or continuation of suits other than suits to enforce liens upon
the property of a debtor, and may, upon notice and for cause shown, enjoin
or stay until final decree any act or the commencement or continuation
of any proceeding to enforce any lien upon the property of a debtor.
26 BANKRUPTCY ACT § 614, 11 U.S.C. § 1014. This section is identical with
§ 314, quoted in footnote 25 supra.
27 144 F. Supp. 108 (E.S. Pa. 1956).
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enforcement of the provisions of the Act, from the power conferred
by Section 262 of the Judicial Code to issue all writs which may be
necessary for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the district court,
and from the general equity powers of a court of bankruptcy. The
temporary restraining order may be granted without notice to the ad-
verse party if it clearly appears by affidavit or in the verified petition
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to
the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.
28
He reasons that the restraining order is issued merely upon the
assumption that the petition is correct, and the court assumes so
only until someone offers to prove otherwise. It is not based upon
any fact findings of the court. It is issued upon a verified petition
and contains a provision that any party in interest may move to
vacate. He states:
No conceivable advantage could accrue from putting a ten day limita-
tion upon a restraining order such as the present one. Not only would
it be contrary to universally accepted practice but it would be incon-
venient, burdensome and an unnecessary waste of time of the court
and counsel to have the order renewed every ten days. The order it-
self provides that any party in interest may move to vacate it upon
application to the court. The court will always entertain a motion to
vacate, upon any showing of good cause.
29
The case of In re Arzaga80 followed the rationale of the Haines
case and held that Rule 65(b) was not applicable to a proceeding
under section 614 of Chapter XIII. The decision of In re California
Lumber Co. is distinguished as a decision under the straight bank-
ruptcy chapter and thus not a precedent which would be binding
under the facts of this case. The decisive distinction is that in
ordinary bankruptcy proceedings Rule 65(b) is applicable because
it is not inconsistent with the act. However, in Chapter XIII pro-
ceedings Congress has provided specific procedural requirements
relating to injunctive relief in section 614. Since Rule 65(b) is
inconsistent with section 614, it would not fall within the scope of
General Order 37 and should have no application in Chapter XIII
proceedings. A logical extension would be that since section 614 of
Chapter XIII and section 314 of Chapter XI are substantially
identical, this decision then would be applicable to Chapter XI
proceedings as well as Chapter XIII.
A survey concerning the applicability of Rule 65(b) to bank-
ruptcy proceedings was recently conducted by the Bankruptcy
28 Id. at 109.
29 Ibid.
30 204 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Calif. 1962). For an excellent discussion of In re
Arzaga, see Treister, Ex Parte Restraining Orders in Rehabilitation Proceedings, 36
REF. J. 110 (1962).
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Committee of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference. In response
to a questionnaire sent out by the Committee, those referees of the
Ninth Circuit who replied indicated that little if any uniformity in
practice and procedure exists. Some referees adhere to the limita-
tions of Rule 65(b) while others do not. The split appears to be
about equal; half of those questioned contended that Rule 65(b)
applies to bankruptcy, while the remaining thought that it does not.
Those alleging that the Rule does not apply point out that
crowded court calendars render it almost impossible to determine
the matters within the ten day limitation. Others contend that the
limitations are impractical, since many referees hold court in dif-
ferent cities where they often have hearing days only once a month.
In such cases a hearing within ten days would be impossible.
CONCLUSION
As noted above many bankruptcy courts have reasoned that
Rule 65(b) applies to ordinary bankruptcy proceedings because
it is "not inconsistent with the Act."'" In other words, no provision
appears in the Bankruptcy Act which would in any way conflict
or be inconsistent with the application of Rule 65(b) to straight
bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, regardless of crowded calendars
or geographical inconvenience the bankruptcy court should accept
Rule 65(b) as binding. As pointed out in a recent decision:
The drastic remedy of injunctive relief should issue only in extra-
ordinary circumstances where the court is satisfied that a right is
about to be destroyed or irreparably injured by an illegal act. Rule 65
was adopted to guard against abuse of the remedy. 2
On the other hand, it is the consensus of opinion that Rule 65(b)
does not apply to the rehabilitation provisions of Chapters XI and
XIII. Section 314 of Chapter XI and section 614 of Chapter XIII
indicate that Congress intended that injunctive relief should be
granted more liberally in the rehabilitative proceedings than in ordi-
nary bankruptcy proceedings. Thus referees should not be bound
by the ten day limitations in Chapter XI and XIII proceedings.
The practical obstacles that have occurred in attempts to
adhere to the limitations of Rule 65(b) in strict bankruptcy pro-
ceedings indicate that some modifications are necessary. A possible
solution might be a provision in the Bankruptcy Act which would
extend the ten day period until the next hearing will take place,
when the proceedings cannot be held within the limited time. At
31 See notes 15 and 17 and accompanying text supra.
32 In re California Lumber Corp., 24 F.R.D. 190 (S.D. Calif. 1959).
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the present time the failure of many to recognize that a problem
exists has resulted in confusion and the arbitrary determination
of the question presented. While a referee's discretion is often
highly desirable, it seems in this instance that uniformity should
prevail.
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